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Abstract:  Recognizing that human rationality has bounds that are unequal across individuals 
entails treating it as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its 
own  uses.  This causes a meta-mathematical difficulty to the axiomatic theories of human 
capital and resource allocation, and raises a new problem for comparative institutional 
analysis, allowing it to explain some so far little understood differences between markets and 
government.  The policy implications strengthen the case against national planning, selective 
industrial policies, and government ownership of enterprises, but weaken the case against 
paternalism. 
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Most economic theories have so far been based on the idealizing assumption that all economic 
agents are perfectly rational, able to find optimal solutions to all their problems, however 
difficult.  Since the pioneering work by Simon (1955), however, dissent has been growing, 
using theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to demonstrate that far from that perfect, 
human rationality is significantly bounded.
1 
  But most of this dissent has been about the rationality bounds of one typical human 
mind, without considering their possible individual differences.  This is only the step from 
assuming everyone’s rationality equally perfect to assuming it equally bounded.  This paper 
takes one more step: it recognizes that human rationality is not only bounded, but moreover 
unequally so.  Whether the inequalities stem from inborn talents (“nature”) or from education 
and experience (“nurture”), the fact simply is that the rationality of some individuals is 
bounded more, or differently, than the rationality of others. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine what this fact implies for theory and policy, 
with particular attention to the long-standing markets vs. government issue.  The ultimate 
objective is to discover some so far little-noted merits and demerits of the two, which could 
help to answer the basic policy question of how the performance of an economy could, and 
how it could not, be improved, in terms of given success criteria, by public policies. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section I defines and clarifies the notion of 
unequally bounded rationality.  Section II brings to light the meta-matematical difficulties that 
this notion causes to axiomatic economics, in particular to the theories of human capital and 
resource-allocation theory, and states the new problem that it raises for comparative 
institutional analysis.  Section III develops a logical analysis of this problem, illustrated by a 
simple mathematical model, to compare the treatment of unequally bounded rationality by 
markets with that by government.  Section IV infers policy implications.  Section V presents 
concluding comments. 
 
                                                 
1  The bounded vs. unbounded rationality debate is now extremely rich and ramified, which makes it difficult to 
refer to it in any systematic way.  In addition to Simon (1955, 1978, 2000), my main references are Alchian 
(1950), Friedman (1953), Winter (1971), Sugden (1991), Kahneman and Tversky (2000), and Vanberg (2002, 
2004).    2
I.   Unequally Bounded Rationality 
 
  The definitions of “rationality” that can be found in economic literature fall into two 
classes: the purely formal, or tautological ones, and the empirically meaningful ones, which 
link rationality to actual cognitive abilities (competencies, “intelligence”) of human brains.
2  
Only the latter makes it possible to recognize that rationality bounds are individually unequal, 
and indeed to admit that human rationality has bounds at all.  The present definition must 
therefore be of this class.
3 
  DEFINITION 1.  “Rationality” means the cognitive abilities of human brains for 
solving economic problems – that is, problems of how best to use given resources under given 
constraints for the pursuit of given objectives (preferences, objective function).  It can exist in 
different varieties, relevant to different kinds of economic problems – e.g., involving different 
types of resources, different time horizons, or different degrees of risk or uncertainty.  An 
individual’s rationality is bounded if there are economic problems for which he or she is 
unable to find an optimal solution.
4 
  “Rationality” thus means only a subset of the human cognitive abilities that may be 
considered to belong to human rationality in a more general sense.  But this subset is very 
special to economists.  It is what most of their rationality debate has been about, and it also 
perfection of at least some of these abilities that most of their theories need to assume.  Note 
that this even includes the theories of procedural rationality and rational irrationality: while 
they admit bounded rationality for certain economic problems, they assume perfect rationality 
 
                                                 
 
2  The two categories closely correspond to the distinction between the non-refutable rationality principle and 
refutable rationality hypotheses used by Vanberg (2004). 
 
3  Note why the purely formal definitions of rationality are unsuitable – not only here, but for all economic 
problems involving more than one person.  Their aim is to save the assumption of perfect (unbounded) 
rationality even for an individual blatantly unable to find the right solutions to his economic problems.  To make 
it possible to say that even such an individual maximizes his objective function under his constraints, these 
definitions include among these constraints also the ones on his or her maximization abilities (see, e.g., Boland, 
1981).  Everyone can then indeed be said to be “perfectly rational” in the tautological sense of doing his or her 
best, however severe these constraints might be.  But to say so may be harmless only for one-person problems.  
When several individuals are involved – which includes all policy issues – everyone can of course still be said to 
do his or her best, but this obscures the crucial fact that for the same objective function, the “best” of some 
individuals may be much better, or much worse, than the “best” of others. 
 
4  As bounded rationality is sometimes confused with imperfect information about the state of the world, note 
that the two are here sharply distinguished: rationality only means the personal cognitive abilities to find, 
understand and use such information, but not the information itself.  It is in the exploiting of the same imperfect 
information that some of the most important rationality differences come to light. 
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for the higher-level economic problem of how best to use the bounded rationality.  In contrast, 
no such perfection is assumed here. 
  ASSUMPTION 1.  Rationality of all varieties and all levels is both bounded and 
individually unequal.  For the sake of brevity, an individual whose rationality (relevant to a 
certain type of economic problems) is less bounded than the rationality of another individual 
will be said to be (for these problems) “more rational,” and his rationality to be “higher.” 
  Unequally bounded rationality raises the problem of its measuring.  In principle, it 
could be measured by marking, in the entire set of the differently difficult problems that the 
agents of an economy might encounter, the subset of the sufficiently easy ones for which a 
given individual is able to find an optimal solution; or by estimating, for different problems of 
the entire set, the relative losses caused by the errors that the individual would likely commit 
if assigned to the task of solving them. 
  In practice, however, its measuring is limited to artificial experiments, intelligence 
tests, and problems in economic textbooks, which cannot yield more that rough and often 
insufficient indications.  For many real-world economic problems, especially the most 
complex ones, the relevant rationality cannot be objectively measured at all.  It can only be 
subjectively estimated, with the risk of committing more or less large errors.  These errors 
depend on the rationality of the estimating individuals: the more bounded this rationality, the 
larger the errors will likely be.  Importantly, this also includes the cases when individuals 
estimate their own rationality: those suffering from severe rationality bounds are likely to 
commit large errors also in such estimations, as they are typically unaware of how severe 
these bounds really are.
5  This raises the question of recognizing rationality by rationality 
(RRR), which appears plausible to answer, in a first verbal approximation, as follows. 
  ASSUMPTION 2 (“RRR-ASSUMPTION”).  When estimating the rationality of 
others, individuals safely recognize those whose rationality is lower than theirs, but are unable 
fully to appreciate the possibly subtle differences between their rationality and all the higher 
rationality, and may moreover have irrelevant prejudices that make them underestimate the 
rationality of a more or less large subset of such equally or more rational individuals.  They may 
count in this subset themselves, if their prejudices include an inferiority complex. 
  It is sometimes important to consider that rationality can be improved by learning.  
                                                 
5  In addition to casual observations of (and frequent irritation with) such individuals during personal encounters, 
their existence is now solidly documented in experimental psychology by Kruger and Dunning (1999), in their 
wittily titled article "Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to 
inflated self-assessment.”  This evidence devalues all the standard models of allocation of abilities, including 
talents, that stand and fall with the assumption that all agents perfectly know the abilities of themselves. 
   4
Then, however, it is also important to consider that all learning requires pre-existing learning 
abilities, which limit what their owner can possibly learn in the most ideal learning 
environments.  Note that this requirement is also valid for all meta-learning – the learning to 
learn – which requires corresponding meta-learning abilities.  A simple recursive reasoning 
suffices to infer that all learning, regardless of the number of its meta-levels, must unfold 
from, and be ultimately limited by, some inborn learning abilities – commonly called “talents” 
– which must also be included among the cognitive abilities that may, and usually also do, 
differ across individuals.  This makes it necessary to split the rationality of each individual 
into at least two components: actual rationality, which may vary over time by learning; and 
potential rationality or talents, which may in a first approximation be considered constant.
6 
  Here, however, rationality learning may often be omitted, as this omission does not 
help the present argument, but rather works against it.  Namely, taking rationality learning 
into account, far from weakening its assumptions, can only make them stronger.  Differences 
in talents imply that even when rationality is considered improvable by learning, it must 
nevertheless be recognized ultimately bounded, with different bounds for different 
individuals.
7  And the possibilities of learning increase the difficulty of estimating an 
individual’s rationality, and thus also the importance of the rationality for estimating it.  As is 
well known in economic praxis, talents often matter more and are always more difficult to 
estimate than actual rationality: recognizing talents requires talents. 
 
II.  Consequences for Economic Theories 
 
  Recognizing that rationality has individually unequal bounds entails including it 
among scarce resources: individuals possess it in different quantities and qualities, and both 
their personal achievements and the performance of the entire economy depend on its uses.  
But being both a scarce resource and the ability needed for deciding on the uses of scarce 
resources implies that it is needed for deciding on its own uses.  This implication causes a 
                                                 
6  A deeper study of human cognitive abilities would moreover have to consider that learning is a path-dependent 
process during which some of the initially given talents may be neglected and lost, or even purposefully blocked 
– e.g., by ideological or religious “brain-washing”.  This would make it necessary further to distinguish the 
constant inborn talents from the actual state of learning abilities, which vary over time in function of the entire 
series of past inputs by which the inborn talents have been developed, or neglected, or blocked. 
 
7  Note that contrary to the wishful popular belief, learning is no reliable way of decreasing cognitive 
inequalities.  Because of individual differences in talents, it may on the contrary increase them.  The only way to 
decrease them is hindering the more talented individuals from learning more than the less talented ones, which 
would cause (and in some countries appears actually to cause) enormous social losses. 
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meta-mathematical difficulty to all axiomatic economics, and raises a new problem for 
comparative institutional analysis.  It can be regarded as a cousin to the Russel Paradox, 
which destroyed much of Kantor’s original set theory, and to the Gödel Theorem, which 
proves that no axiom-based theory can be both consistent and complete.  Axiomatic 
economics cannot indeed be complete in the sense that it can consistently deal with nearly all 
kinds of scarcities, but just not with that of rationality.  Considering this implication for the 
standard theories of human capital and resource allocation can convey the main idea.
8 
 
A.  Human Capital Theory 
 
  In the standard classification of scarce resources, rationality is clearly a kind of human 
capital.  Like all the usual varieties of this capital, it is tied to individuals, who cannot obtain it 
by direct communication, but can only improve it by own learning from costly education and 
experience.  The key economic problem is thus the same: how much to invest in this learning? 
  But human capital theory, instead of finding the solution, leads to a paradox.  As it is 
built on the perfect rationality assumption, it is limited to individuals who optimally invest in 
improving their currently imperfect human capital, given all the relevant costs and benefits of 
such investments over time.  This allows it to be logically consistent for nearly all varieties of 
human capital, but just not for rationality.  The trouble is that this variety is precisely the one 
needed for all investment decisions, including those on investing in human capital.  Thus, a 
little-rational investor who wants to optimize his investment in improving his rationality now 
may need much of the improved rationality that he is only considering to acquire in the future 
– for instance, by studying human capital theory. 
  To regard bounded rationality as a kind of human capital is nevertheless instructive.  
This makes it clear that in spite of its special status in economics, it is only one among many 
kinds of human abilities and talents, with which individuals may be differently endowed.  
Moreover, as often appears to be the case, the different kinds may be far from correlated – for 
instance, highly talented sportsmen rarely appear to be highly talented musicians and both 
rarely appear to be highly talented (rational) investors.  To see that the talent for becoming a 
highly rational economic agent is only one among many other human talents is useful for not 
overestimating its value.  On the other hand, however, economic analysis of the allocation of 
                                                 
8   A good intutive insight into the meaning of the Gödel Theorem can be obtained from the Pulitzer Prize 
winning book by Hofstadter (1979). 
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talents, not to be misleading, cannot ignore how special (“singular”) this talent is: it is needed 
for recognizing the value of all talents (including itself), investing in their development, and 
putting them to social uses.
9 
 
B.  Resource-Allocation Theory 
 
  In addition to conflicting with the perfect rationality assumption, unequally bounded 
rationality disturbs standard resource-allocation theory by destroying the conceptual barrier 
between the sphere of agents and the sphere of resources, which the theory needs to separate 
rationality from scarcity.  The agents, assumed to keep their initially given positions, use their 
assumedly abundant rationality for conducting economic calculus and deciding on the 
allocation of the scarce resources, while the resources move around and are allocated to 
different uses as a result of the agents’ decisions.  Intuitively, one may think of the difference 
between the players of a game of cards and the cards.  The theory needs this barrier to proceed 
in an orderly fashion from the decisions of agents to the allocation of resources. 
  Unequally bounded rationality admits no such barrier.  It spreads into the sphere of 
scarce resources, where its differently bounded individual endowments pose the problem of 
their allocation to efficient uses, while scarcity spreads into the sphere of agents, as agents 
endowed with differently bounded rationality are differently scarce.  As a consequence, the 
agents may not be able to keep their positions.  Rationality allocation may have to move them 
to different uses, much like any other scarce resource.  In the intuitive comparison with a 
game of cards, this is as if the players became themselves cards of different values and were 
included among the cards with which they play. 
  To grasp the unusual features of this situation, consider two usual questions:  (1)  What 
properties must rationality allocation have to be efficient?  (2) Starting from an inefficient 
state, what processes can make it approach efficiency? 
  To deal with question (1), it appears necessary to view the economy as a network of 
differently difficult decision tasks (positions), forming a certain configuration of markets and 
organizations, to which its differently rational individuals are assigned (allocated, selected 
                                                 
9   Note that this puts in doubt all the standard models of allocation of talents, in which this special position of 
talents for economic decision-making is not recognized.  A clear example is their prototype in Murphy, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1991) with the remarkable conclusion that using talents in engineering is more productive than 
using them in investment speculation.  This conclusion misses the crucial point that engineers must know which 
of their many technically feasible projects are also economically sound, and that speculation on financial markets 
is an essential ingredient of what will be shown below to be the best feasible ways of finding this out. 
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for).  Rationality allocation works through the designing and redesigning of these positions, 
and through their assigning and reassigning to different individuals.  The entire network is 
thus being formed and reformed – for instance, by creating, growing, restructuring or 
liquidating firms, and by opening, developing, or closing markets. 
  A similar view is used in the literature on markets and organizations following 
Williamson (1975).  But the difference is that this literature only studies the general forms of 
the two, whereas analysis of rationality allocation must enter into the methodologically 
individualistic details of how the differently difficult positions within these forms are 
designed and assigned to differently rational individuals by differently rational individuals.  
As clarified below, this entering into individualistic details is important for comprehending 
what is well known in business practice, but what studies of general organizational forms 
cannot capture – that a few key individuals can cause enormous performance differences 
among organizations of the same form. 
  In such a possibly changing network, an efficient rationality allocation can roughly be 
described as avoiding the two opposite inefficiencies: assigning some highly rational 
individuals to too easy positions, and thus wasting their scarce high rationality; and selecting 
insufficiently rational individuals for too difficult positions – or, in Heiner’s (1983) words, 
creating competence-difficulty gaps – and thus wasting resources because of the errors that 
these individuals are bound to cause. 
  In question (2), the main problem is that unequally rational individuals generate less 
thrust for moving from less efficient to more efficient allocations than the perfectly rational 
agents of standard theory, who always see and exploit all opportunities for efficiency-
increasing transactions.  In some inefficient rationality allocations the thrust may be zero, so 
that the inefficiency is perpetuated, or even negative, so that it will grow.  This can happen if 
the rationality relevant to gaining positions is not closely correlated with the one relevant to 
functioning in them.  Individuals of low relevant rationality can then gain and retain key 
positions from which they can keep misallocating the higher rationality of other agents.
10 
  Even in the best case, rationality allocation cannot be expected to move towards 
efficiency straightforwardly.  Because of the more or less bounded rationality of the 
                                                 
10  Insider observations of the late socialist economies of the Central and Eastern Europe suggest that such 
misallocations were among the main reasons why these economies were bound to collapse.  For an excellent 
satirical description of a similar situation in a large private firm, see, in the classical book by Parkinson (1956), 
the chapter on “Injelitis” – an organizational disease caused by a combination of incompetence and jealousy that 
gets hold of the top management.  For reasons discussed below, similar situations are both more likely to occur 
and longer to last in government organizations. 
       8
individuals who run it, it cannot avoid blind alleys that end in more or less costly errors, and 
thus also cause more or less long detours.  It can therefore approach efficiency only by a trial-
and-error evolutionary process, of which the best-known example is the Darwinian evolution 
of life by random mutations and natural selection.
11 
  Such a process can be anatomized into series of two types of stages: (A) generating 
imperfectly informed (in the Darwinian case entirely random) “trials” (experiments, 
innovations, mutations); and (B) testing and sorting the generated trials into “errors,” forced 
to be corrected or eliminated, and “successes,” selected for a more or less lasting preservation. 
  In rationality allocation, as follows from the answer to question (1), the main trials 
consist of tentative designs of differently difficult decision tasks (positions), and tentative 
assignments (allocations) of the tasks designed to agents of differently bounded rationality, 
including tentative designs and tentative assignments of the tasks of task-designing and task-
assigning.  Such trials can indeed be seen as the basic steps of which the creation, 
restructuring, and expansion or shrinking, of markets and organizations are made.  They can 
then be more or less relevantly tested, and their errors more or less sharply and more or less 
rapidly disclosed, by market competition, or government decisions, or a mix of both.
12 
  Any process that can unfold in several differently advantageous ways raises the 
problem of its control: how to guide (shape) it, to make it unfold as advantageously as 
possible?  The difficulty is that standard control theory, which solves control problems by 
assuming a specific controlling agent and determining his optimal conduct is here of little use.  
Namely, it cannot be known in advance which of the economy’s agents, if any, would be so 
highly rational as to be able to control this process reasonably well, let alone optimally.  This 
leaves only one possibility: if the control cannot be entrusted to any a priori chosen person(s), 
its tools must be sought among impersonal institutions in the modern sense of rules-constraints 
(“rules of the game”), consisting of formal laws and informal social norms.
13 
 
                                                 
11  Such processes are studied in evolutionary economics, with the classical contributions by Schumpeter (1934, 
1942), Alchian (1950), Winter (1971), and Nelson and Winter (1982). 
 
12  In this context, the term “error” means an actually tried rationality allocation that is, or a new discovery 
causes it to be, wasteful (inefficient), causing actual and/or opportunity losses.  Using this term helps to keep in 
mind the common “trial-and-error” logic of all evolutionary processes. 
 
13  As explained with particular clarity by North (1990), defining “institutions” as rules of the game and 
distinguishing them sharply from “organizations” as collectives of agents playing the game is a necessary step 
for putting institutional economics on a solid conceptual basis.  As long as the two logically disparate concepts 
are mixed – which is what the word “institutions” does in most natural languages and in the old institutional 
economics – no clear institutional analysis is possible.  
   9
C.  Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 
  Institutions in this sense are studied in the rapidly expanding field of new institutional 
economics, including property rights theory, law and economics, and constitutional economics.  
So far, however, rationality has been assumed there either equally perfect or equally bounded, 
and its analysis has mostly been non-evolutionary, concentrating on the effects of institutions on 
incentives (often mainly transaction costs), and static efficiency.
14  To deal with the 
evolutionary process of rationality allocation, it needs to expand more.   
  The effects of institutions that also need to be taken into account may suitably be called 
“evolutionary,” and classified, following the above anatomy of evolutionary processes, into 
effects A, shaping the generation of trials, and effects B, shaping the elimination of errors.  
Effects A include the shaping by different forms of property rights of the freedom of 
enterprise, of the positive and negative incentives for using this freedom, and of the access of 
entrepreneurs to capital.  Effects B include the shaping by different forms of bankruptcy law 
of the restructuring, the shrinking, and the closing down of enterprises. 
  A small but interesting increase of the powers of comparative institutional analysis 
immediately follows.  Some important, but previously little noted merits and demerits of 
alternative institutions can be disclosed by simply comparing them for effects A, the variety 
of the trials that they allow and encourage to be generated, and for effects B, the precision and 
the speed with which they force the errors committed to be eliminated.  As it is advantageous 
not to miss highly successful trials, some of which may be very rare, nor to leave wasteful 
errors uncorrected for a long time, it is possible to conclude, subject to certain qualifications, 
that institutions X are superior to institutions Y if they allow and encourage a greater variety 
of trials and enforce a sharper and faster elimination of errors.
15 
                                                 
14  To be precise, both limitations of human cognition and evolutionary processes are there attracting growing 
attention, recently in North (2005) and Eggertsson (2005).  But this attention appears limited to the evolution of 
institutions themselves, leaving aside the present problem of how markets and organizations evolve and how 
rationality is consequently allocated under different given institutions.  Both these authors assume this problem 
to be unsolved, with the implication that different political actors, depending on their cognitive limitations, may 
have more or less mistaken mental models of it, which is one of the reasons why institutions may evolve 
towards, or remain blocked in, more or less imperfect states.  Somewhat surprisingly, institutional analysis is 
little used in search of its solution, which could allow the political actors to improve their mental models by 
replacing their divergent ideological beliefs – e.g., about the merits and demerits of different forms of ownership 
of firms, freedom of enterprise, and government social and industrial policies – by definite analytical results. 
 
15  Applications of this simple analysis are in Pelikan (1988, 1992).  They proved to be more informative about 
the weaknesses of different forms of socialism and the then widely admired Japanese industrial policies than the 
more complex mathematical models of that time, which were on the contrary proving that both could be optimal.  
That a simple analysis may be more informative than an artificially complex one is also illustrated by the well-  10
  To link these effects to rationality allocation, it is necessary to consider the individuals 
by whom the generation of trials and the elimination of errors are run, and the ways in which 
different institutions shape their selection and the design of their positions.  While the 
availability of relevant information is always limited, so that many trials can never avoid to be 
errors, the trials have more chance to succeed, and the relatively fewer errors have more 
chance to be rapidly discovered and eliminated, if the generation of trials and the elimination 
of errors are assigned to individuals with higher relevant rationality rather than lower – for 
such individuals are better at discovering and using whatever limited information might be 
available – and if these positions are not allowed to grow more difficult than what the 
rationality of the individuals selected for them can reasonably handle. 
  To be sure, following all the differently rational individuals in an economy in their 
differently demanding and possibly changing positions is hardly feasible.  But fortunately, 
analysis can be simplified, without loss of relevance, in three ways. 
  SIMPLIFICATION 1.  Attention can be narrowed to a subset of key positions.
16  
Within each organization – be it a private firm, a cooperative, or a government agency – the 
internal rationality allocation can be put on the account of the rationality allocated to a few 
top positions.  Comparative analysis of institutions of economies can consequently consider 
only these top positions, leaving the inside rationality allocation to organizational theories. 
  For comparative purposes, it suffices to consider only two suitably defined top 
positions – owners and entrepreneurs – provided they are defined with enough generality to 
make them appear at the top of all the different organizations of an economy. 
  DEFINITION 2.  The owners supply organizations with the capital that the 
organizations need to form, function, and grow up to a certain size.  The entrepreneurs supply 
organizations with projects for both the external activities and the internal form, and make the 
first moves from which the realization of these projects unfolds.
17 
                                                                                                                                                         
known findings of a strong correlation between economic freedom and growth (for their survey, see Berggren, 
2003), which compares institutions only for a subset of effects A. 
 
16  That “a handful of heroes” may be crucial for the success of large collectives is nicely shown, in the context of 
economic reforms, by Harberger (1993).  In the context of rationality allocation, the crucial “heroes” are likely 
more than handful, but they still constitute only a limited subset of all individuals. 
 
17  As the term “entrepreneur” still lacks a generally accepted precise definition, I am taking the liberty to define 
it to suit my argument.  But this definition appears to agree quite well what this term is usually  understood to 
mean.  Interestingly, this agreement includes the classical views of both Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1973), 
which may be seen to disagree with each other: the former sees entrepreneurs to disturb market equilibria by 
innovations, and the latter sees them to work towards market equilibria by observing and exploiting some not yet 
exploited price differences.  The present definition can agree with both simply by considering them only to differ   11
  Managers are situated just below these tops.  They lead the functioning of already 
formed organizations, but are subordinate to entrepreneurs during the forming (organizing, 
reforming) of these organizations – when the internal rationality allocation takes place.  It is 
the latter who design and assign their positions, including their rights to design and assign 
other positions, and including the limits within which they may modify their own position. 
  As owners, entrepreneurs and managers are all defined as positions, it is possible, and 
under some institutions necessary, that two or all three of them are assigned to the same 
persons.  For instance, an organization’s entrepreneur may be, and often also is, the same 
person as its manager: the entrepreneur, after having designed, possibly only in her head, the 
position of the manager, may assign it to herself. 
  Why the rationality of owners and entrepreneurs is so crucial can be explained as 
follows.  In all organizations, the designing and redesigning of all the other positions and their 
assigning and reassigning to specific individuals are done by their entrepreneurs either 
directly, subject to explicit or tacit approval by the owners, or indirectly, by delegating some 
of the designing and assigning to some of the directly assigned individuals in the directly 
designed positions, to begin with the managers.  There may be even more indirectness, as the 
delegating may be multilevel, allowing or requiring some of these individuals to delegate 
some of the designing and assigning to yet other individuals.  Moreover, all may be allowed 
or tolerated to modify and elaborate within certain limits their own positions, and thus engage 
in complementary self-organizing.  Yet the entrepreneurs, and by extension the owners, 
remain ultimately responsible for how all this will unfold.  If something goes wrong and their 
organization underperforms, the ultimate responsibility is theirs, for this implies that they 
must have wrongly designed, or allowed to be wrongly designed, some positions, and/or 
assigned, or allowed to be assigned, some positions to the wrong persons. 
  Note that all this is well known in business practice, which is why changing the CEO 
of a firm, who is typically both its top manager and its organizing and reorganizing 
entrepreneur, often dramatically changes its stock-market value.  But organizational theories 
often view team work, collective decisions, and cooperation of large collectives as more 
important than leading individuals.  This divergence of views is at least partly due to the 
difference between the functioning and the forming of organizations: much more team work 
and collective decisions are possible in the former than in the latter.  These theories may be 
right about the functioning, yet without diminishing the importance of a few top individuals 
                                                                                                                                                         
in market strategies.  As its main concern is the internal organization of firms, on which neither Schumpeter nor 
Kirzner says much, it cannot conflict with either.   12
for the forming: while most of the functioning may be team work and collective decisions, the 
positions from which it is run must have been designed and the individuals who run it must 
have been selected during the forming and reforming under the ultimate control of some 
entrepreneur(s).  For example, although the CEOs of firms may often work cooperatively in 
teams, it is typically they who select the team members and design the main lines of the 
cooperation.  Other examples are democratically run cooperatives, all of which owe their 
existence and basic features to the ideas and initiative of a few enthusiastic entrepreneurs. 
  What remains to be explained is how rationality is allocated to the owners and 
entrepreneurs of organizations.  The positions of entrepreneurs are largely self-designed by 
the individuals assigned to them, under the constraint of the capital supplied to them by 
owners.  This supply is also the means by which their positions are assigned: owners select 
entrepreneurs from the more or less large number of candidates competing for their capital 
(who may or must include themselves).  The positions of owners are designed and assigned 
by the property rights that constrain the ways in which they can obtain and control capital. 
  Simplification 1 allows the following logical shortcut:  The performance of an 
economy depends on the performance of its organizations, which depends on the rationality of 
their owners and entrepreneurs, which depends on the institutions that shape the designing 
and the assigning of these positions. 
  For the other simplifications, it is necessary to split analysis into the production side 
and the final consumption side. 
  SIMPLIFICATION 2.  All individuals, regardless of their rationality differences, not 
to starve to death, must remain final consumers.
18  The final consumption side thus excludes 
the use of evolutionary selection (at least in civilized societies) by which insufficiently 
rational individuals would purposefully be eliminated.  Rationality allocation is there limited 
to individual learning of given consumers under the constraint of their unequal learning 
talents, and analysis can therefore concentrate on how different institutions shape the inputs 
for this learning – e.g., by the rights of consumers to be informed and the duties of firms and 
government agencies to supply them with information.  The most important organizations of 
this side are government agencies, usually required to determine the demand for public goods, 
and under some institutions moreover allowed or required to influence by certain paternalistic 
policies the demand for private goods. 
                                                 
18  This simplification also makes it clear that the present argument, in spite of its largely Darwinian logic, is no 
part of the old-fashioned “social Darwinism,” discredited for its uncivilized implications.  
   13
  On the production side, rationality allocation can use all of its evolutionary ways in 
full: most positions can be there designed and redesigned or abolished, including births and 
deaths of entire organizations, and individuals can be promoted to, or demoted from, all of 
them, without having to die.  But comparative analysis can be there simplified in another way. 
  SIMPLIFICATION 3.  The production side can be freed from the influences of 
subjective preferences and values, known for making all comparison difficult, by concentrating 
them on the final consumption side.  To do so, it suffices to define the final demand broadly 
enough – e.g., as also including the demand for nature-protection, job-creation and working 
conditions – to make it express the entire task for the production side.  The stream of possible 
errors (losses, inefficiencies) caused by little-rational economic decisions can then be divided 
into those on the final consumption side and those on the production side.  The former mean 
that the final demand fails to reflect some important aspects of what may be argued to be the 
consumers’ true well-being (“happiness”) – on which opinions may widely differ depending 
on the preferences and values held.  The latter mean that some resources fail to be used 
efficiently for meeting this demand, on which, once this demand is determined, subjective 
preferences and values have little to say.  Analysis of this side can thus treat the final demand 
as a “black box,” whose contents need not be specified: whatever this might be, inefficient 
rationality allocation in production would always make it suffer. 
 
III.  Rationality Allocation by Markets and by Government 
 
  Addressing the markets vs. government issue has here two purposes.  One is to see 
how comparative institutional analysis of rationality allocation can be conducted and what it 
can achieve when applied to a specific problem.  The other is actually to find some so far 
little-noted merits and demerits of the two, which could bring this long-standing and still 
largely open issue closer to its definitive, generally accepted analytical solution. 
  But note two limitations.  First, the aim is only to compare how markets and 
government work as means of allocating rationality under given institutions – and not as 
means of forming and reforming institutions.  To what extent an economy’s institutions may 
or must be legislated by government and to what extent they may or must arise spontaneously 
from the practice of market transactions, although also a long-standing and still largely open 
issue, will not be directly addressed. 
  Second, rationality analysis can only complement and qualify, but not invalidate, the 
known results of incentive analysis.  More than that, these results must be used to qualify its   14
own results.  Much like correct incentives are of little help if addressed to little-rational 
agents, high rationality is of little help, and may even be dangerous, if not tamed and 
channelled by correct incentives. 
  The comparison will proceed in two rounds: by verbal logic and by elementary 
mathematical modeling.  While the former is only rough, its advantage is plausibly to include 
most of real-world situations.  The latter is precise, but requires some not very realistic 
assumptions.  The main reason for using both is that their results clarify and support each 
other: the mathematics adds an interesting detail, and the verbal logic shows that the result of 
the mathematics, in spite of its unrealistic assumptions, are reasonable. 
 
A.  The Question 
 
  Consider a population of individuals forming an economy, each of whom keeps one 
basically stable position on the final consumption side, and may be selected for one or several 
possibly variable positions on the production side. 
  Assume that the rationality distribution over them is roughly normal (“the bell curve”),  
thus similar to the known distributions of most of human abilities, highest at “the average,” 
and down to very few “economic champions” and very few “economic fools” at the extremes.  
But its precise shape is secondary.  Institutions must be able to deal with rationality 
inequalities, largely regardless of how distributed.  Analysis is quite free to choose this shape 
as a special test of this general ability of institutions.  The test is only required to be difficult 
enough not to allow poorly able institutions to pass it with success.
19 
  The individuals know this distribution only imperfectly, the more imperfectly, the less 
rational they are.  Moreover, as noted with reference to Kruger and Dunning (1999), they may 
not even know the state of their own rationality.  The few who know it are not known to most 
of the others, and many more may believe to know it, but are mistaken.  For instance, many 
may believe to be best, but only very few may be right.
20 
                                                 
19  This requirement follows from the commonsense logic with which technical engineers test their constructions.  
But it may appear foreign in economics, with the widespread habit of analyzing economic systems in assumed 
ideal conditions.  That this habit is not very fruitful is illustrated by the inability of the field of comparative 
economic systems to produce clear results, simply because under suitably idealized conditions, any system can 
be proven to be optimal.  This habit is indeed one of the reasons why this field failed to foresee that so many 
real-world economies would fall into a crisis when faced with real-world difficulties. 
 
20  When it is recognized that people tend to overestimate their abilities, as is sometimes done in management 
literature, the very few who do not, but are irritatingly right that their abilities are exceptionally high, are often 
ignored (might it be that the theorists envy them?).  Yet, as will become clear below, it is they who deserve the   15
  Assume that the economy starts with a certain capital and the inefficient rationality 
allocation which divides the control over the capital equally among the entire population or a 
random sample of it.  This rationality allocation is inefficient simply because too much capital 
is controlled by little-rational owners and too little by the most rational ones, so that the 
economy initially performs less well than what its capital would potentially allow it to do. 
  Assume moreover that whatever other positions may need to be assigned – such as 
those of entrepreneurs and politicians – the rationality distribution over the candidates for 
these positions equals the one over the entire population. 
  To compare markets and governments for their effects on how the initial rationality 
allocation will evolve, consider three stylized institutional variants: primitive capitalism (PC), 
financial capitalism (FC) and democratic government (DG).  Their property rights over 
capital, from which this allocation was shown to unfold, are defined as follows. 
  Both PC and FC force the producing organizations (including one-person firms) to 
compete with their outputs on markets, and both allocate the ensuing gains and losses to the 
capital owners of the organizations that have realized them.  But PC forces the owners to be 
their own entrepreneurs, whereas FC allows them to select the entrepreneurs for their capital 
from a set of competing candidates on the financial market (possibly including themselves). 
  While the output of government organizations may or may not be exposed to market 
competition, the main feature of DG is to keep the ultimate ownership of their capital, and 
therefore also all their gains and losses, equally distributed among all the citizens.  As this 
makes the number of their owners very large, these must elect from a set of competing 
political candidates ruling politicians, who exercise the effective ownership rights by selecting 
their entrepreneurs from a set of competing civil servants. 
  Although none of these variants can be found used in a pure form, most of today’s 
economies can be seen to use a combination of all three.  Each variant usually has a more or 
less large sector of its own, where rationality allocation is shaped by its specific institutions.  
The results of their theoretical comparison may therefore be practically useful by indicating 
what the relative performance of the three sectors will likely be, and what the economy stands 
to gain or lose by changing their relative sizes – e.g. by privatizing or nationalizing firms, or 
by increasing or restricting the room for financial markets. 
  The question can now be stated as follows:  How do PC, FC, and DG compare for their 
effects on the evolution of rationality allocation over time, and through it, on the economy’s 
                                                                                                                                                          
greatest attention: to find them and give them the opportunities and the incentives to show how valuable their 
leadership may be is the key to the success of any economy.   16
performance?  That the question is about the relative ranking of the variants, and not about 
their precise absolute effects, is crucial: the absolute effects would be much more difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine. 
 
B.  Rough Analysis by Means of Verbal Logic 
 
  The question requires considering time: an institutional variant may excel in the short 
run, but lose in the long run, or vice versa.  Discrete time suffices, and may even be the only 
manageable: the outcome of a long period is therefore understood as an accumulation of the 
outcomes of a series of short periods. 
  Each period starts with a certain rationality allocation to the owners of capital, who 
will influence, depending on both their rationality and the prevailing institutions, the 
rationality of the entrepreneurs, who always crucially influence the output of their 
organizations.  The prevailing institutions then determine how this output will be allocated, 
and how this allocation will change the capital hold by the owners, and consequently the 
rationality allocated to the control over capital for the next period.  The efficiency of this 
allocation, and thereby the performance of the economy, will increase if some of this control 
is reallocated from less rational capital owners to more rational ones.  
  While this causal chain appears simple and clear, a complication is that none of its 
links is strictly deterministic, but all also depend on chance.  For example, good luck may 
allow a little-rational owner to select a highly rational entrepreneur, while this may have bad 
luck, and the organization may perform poorly.  For the ranking of institutional variants, 
however, it appears possible to neglect chance by double averaging, over both organizations 
and time.  This means that all the results found about one organization during one period must 
be understood as concerning an average organization during an average period. 
  Why, in average, rationality matters more is the asymmetry with which chance can 
affect little-rational and highly rational individuals.  Bad luck can lastingly eliminate even the 
most rational entrepreneur, but good luck can hardly help a little-rational entrepreneur more 
than temporarily.  Thus, under the institutions that make the selection for top positions depend 
on actual performance, not all the most rational owners and entrepreneurs are guaranteed to 
succeed, but all the little-rational ones are sooner or later bound to fail. 
  But chance is here important for another reason: it is needed to protect the key RRR-
assumption.  Namely, if the performance of each organization were a deterministic function of 
its entrepreneur’s rationality, this would be easy to infer from observations of its performance,   17
and the assumption would have to be dropped.  It is the distilling in each single case of the 
merits of rationality from the sea of raw data influenced by chance that is difficult and 
requires high rationality.  As noted, this difficulty is amplified by possibilities of learning.  In 
addition to chance, the performance may also be influenced by mistakes of the entrepreneur, 
who may thus appear insufficiently rational.  It is then both difficult and important to estimate 
her talents: will she or won’t she sufficiently soon learn sufficiently high actual rationality?  
The main task of the RRR-assumption is to lead to the following principle. 
 THE  RATIONALITY-BOOSTING-BY-VOTING  (“RBV”) PRINCIPLE.  Consider a 
set of voters and a set of candidates from which the voters are electing a subset.  If the 
rationality distribution is the same over both sets, if each voter has an equal number of votes, 
and if it is rational for the voters to vote for the most rational candidates, then the average 
rationality of the elected agents will exceed the average rationality of the voters. 
  The proof is trivial.  In the worst case, the least rational voters vote irrelevantly 
(randomly), and will thus in average vote for candidates of the average rationality.  But the 
more rational the voters, the more their voting will be biased  in favour of above-the-average-
rational candidates.  When all the votes are counted, the average rationality of the elected 
candidates will therefore be somewhat higher than the average rationality of the voters.  By 
extension, the average rationality of the elected candidates will be even higher, if more 
rational voters have more votes than less rational ones.   
  Rationality analysis is thus more optimistic about democracy than Hayek (1944), who 
accused it of selecting  the worst.  But this optimism is subject to two qualifications.  One is 
that the rationality distribution over the candidates may be inferior to the one over the voters.  
The positive effect of voting is then more modest: the elected candidates will only be in 
average somewhat more rational than the other candidates, but not necessarily the voters.  The 
other qualification concerns problems with incentives, on which more below.
21 
  In any case, however, the positive effect of voting is only modest.  Even in the most 
ideal case, with the best incentives for both the voters and the candidates, while far from 
selecting the worst, it remains far from selecting the best.  This modesty is here crucial. 
  PC,  FC, and DG can now be compared as follows.  What matters most in the short run 
are differences in their uses of the RBV principle.  PC does not use it at all: the owners and 
the entrepreneurs are the same persons, so that the average rationality of both is the same.  FC 
                                                 
21  A frequent objection against the RBV principle has been that people often vote not for the most rational 
candidates, but for candidates with all kinds of other, less relevant properties.  But, provided that in the given 
voting, it is rational for the voters to vote for the most rational candidates, then using other criteria is only a sign 
of their own low rationality, which leaves the principle intact.   18
uses it at least once, when the owners are choosing the entrepreneurs among the candidates on 
the financial market.  DG uses it at least twice, when government entrepreneurs are chosen by 
elected politicians, and when these are elected by the voters. 
  Of course, neither FC nor DG imposes a sharp limit to how many times the RBV 
principle can be used.  FC may use it more than once, by allowing markets for possibly 
several levels of financial intermediaries, such as investment banks, holding companies, and 
mutual funds.  DG may use it more than twice, by adding between the elected politicians and 
the government entrepreneurs possibly several levels of expert committees and sub-
committees.  But this principle is nevertheless likely to be used more times by DG than by 
FC, at least initially: financial markets, even when institutions define for them the widest 
space, need long time to emerge, develop and actually fill this space, whereas government 
expert committees can be established and convoked virtually overnight.  Considering that FC 
uses it once and DG twice can be accepted as a stylized expression of this difference.  
  What matter most in the long run are the differences in the allocation of the resulting 
gains and losses.  Both PC and FC allocate them to the specific owners of the organizations 
that have realized them.  Thus, the more an organization gains, the more the capital of its 
owners will increase, and vice versa.  As the gain depends on the rationality of the owners – 
under PC directly, as they are also the entrepreneurs, and under FC indirectly, through the 
rationality with which they select (or at least approve of) the entrepreneurs – rationality 
allocation will after each period move towards efficiency: the capital that is controlled with 
high rationality will grow, while the one that is controlled with low rationality will shrink.  In 
contrast, DG keeps allocating all the capital gains and losses equally among all the citizens – 
in order to maintain, as it must, the ultimate ownership of capital equally distributed – and the 
rationality allocation to the control of capital will therefore remain stationary. 
  The entire story can now be summarized as follows.  PC starts worst.  Under the 
plausible assumption that positive returns require entrepreneurs of a somewhat above the 
average rationality, most of the initial owners-entrepreneurs will keep losing capital, so that 
the total capital of the economy will start by shrinking.  But, as they will have less and less to 
lose – their organizations will sooner or later go bust – their negative contributions to the 
economy’s capital will taper off, while the positive contributions of the sufficiently rational 
owners-entrepreneurs are increasing and will eventually prevail.  Moreover, as the capital of 
the most rational ones will in average be increasing faster than the capital of the others, the 
control of the economy’s capital will tend to move towards the minority of the relevantly most 
rational individuals, or, more precisely, to that subset of theirs who have not been eliminated   19
by bad luck.  In the long run, the economy’s growth rate will reach the maximum that its for 
capital ownership most rational individuals are able to achieve. 
  The long-term result of PC is trivial: it only confirms the old conclusions by Alchian 
(1950), Friedman (1953) and Winter (1971) that evolution by market competition selects for 
firms maximizing expected returns – that is, organized and run with the highest rationality – 
so that a developed market will eventually contain only such firms.  The short-term result is 
more interesting: it suggests a new solution to the puzzle of why the growth of virtually all 
new market economies has followed the well-known J-curve: first dipping down (to the great 
joy of market opponents), and only with a more or less long delay gradually turning upwards: 
many emerging markets in such economies were indeed initially scourged by large numbers 
of little-rational owners-entrepreneurs who grossly overestimated their rationality. 
  FC starts a little better.  Although the initial average rationality of the owners is again 
the same as the one of the entire population, its use of the RBV principle somewhat improves 
the initial rationality of the entrepreneurs, so that the initial capital losses will be lower.  But 
they may still be large enough to cause a negative growth of the economy, which may 
therefore again follow the J-curve.  But the dip of this J will not be as deep and the upturn will 
come sooner.  In a sense, however, FC cannot beat PC.  They both converge to having all the 
economy’s capital controlled by a subset of the minority of individuals with the highest 
relevant rationality available.  FC only converges to this state faster and at lower social costs: 
the number of insufficiently rational entrepreneurs, the length of their tenure, and their 
opportunities to waste capital, are all in average smaller under FC than under PC. 
  As DG has the initial advantage of more uses of the RBV principle, it can start best.  If 
the average rationality of the population is sufficiently high, these uses may immediately push 
the average rationality of government entrepreneurs above the threshold of positive returns, 
and thus allow the economy to start with a positive growth.  In the long run, however, this 
initial advantage is of little help.  The lasting scourge of DG is that the average rationality of 
the ultimate capital owners must remain to be the average rationality of the entire population, 
which can only modestly be improved by everyone’s learning, constrained by the unequally 
distributed learning talents.  Thus, even with all the extra bits by which the average rationality 
of the government entrepreneurs may in the best case be lifted above the population average, 
these entrepreneurs are bound to remain far from the economic champions eventually selected 
by both PC and FC.  While some of the government entrepreneurs might also be champions, 
they can never be more than rare exceptions. 
   Note that it would help little if the elected politicians or by them selected experts tried   20
to recruit champions from private enterprises.  Because of the likely insufficient relevant 
rationality with which such recruitment could be conducted, the true champions might not be 
recognized.  And even if they were, they would be champions of the past, who might soon 
start to lose, if left in the private sector, to newly appearing champions of the future.  Hiring 
them by government could thus extend their tenure beyond its efficient limit, and might even 
prevent some of the new, superior champions from appearing. 
  The comparison of DG with both PC and FC can thus be condensed into one short 
sentence:  DG may start best, but will end up far worst.  
  Empirical support appears possible to see in the history of Japanese and South Korean 
economies during the time when their industrial development was under an extensive control 
of politicians and by them selected experts, investors and entrepreneurs.  For a couple of 
decades, this appeared to work so well that several distinguished US economists considered 
such industrial policies worth imitating.  But soon after, both these economies unexpectedly 
fell into a deep financial crisis that proved to be structural, rather than cyclical, while the US 
economy, largely based on its relatively transparent financial markets, continued to grow.  As 
this history appears indeed to support the present finding, this finding in turn appears to be a 
hopeful candidate for the still missing theoretical explanations of this history. 
 
C.   An elementary mathematical model 
22 
 
  The model is limited in many ways: it uses only very simple mathematics, reposes on 
several unrealistic assumptions, and can only illustrate the main differences among the three 
institutional variants in their shaping of rationality allocation, while neglecting everything else.  
But it produces definite results that agree with the verbal analysis, and moreover discloses, as a 
mathematical model should, an interesting fine point that the verbal analysis could not see. 
  The Givens. – Consider an economy during a series of periods separated by time points t 
= 0, 1, 2, .... .  At time t its capital is Kt , starting with K0  = 1, and its growth rate is ρt = Kt+1/Kt .
  Individual rationality is graded by integer q ∈ [1, Q], with q = Q denoting its highest 
grade (“economic champions”).  Individual i has rationality qi, but this is not known with 
certainty to anyone, not even to himself.  The rationality distribution over the population is 
binomial, with probability function P(q), distribution function F(q), and average q .  All 
                                                 
22  This section summarizes the main relationships and the main results of the model elaborated in more detail, 
with proofs and a numerical example (but using slightly different symbols), in Pelikan (1997).    21
individuals are voters, of whom three possibly overlapping random samples are the candidates 
for the positions of entrepreneurs, capital owners, and politicians.     
  The performance of organizations is expressed as a growth coefficient, π(q), a 
monotonically increasing function of q, showing how the entrepreneurs of rationality q multiply 
the capital they use, K(q), during one period: K(q)t+1 = π(q)·K(q)t .  The threshold for successful 
entrepreneurship, qS , is defined as π(qS) = 1.  Depending on the severity of the conditions for 
entrepreneurship, qS  may be much higher or somewhat lower than q .  To recall, because of 
influences of chance and learning, π(q) can only be used for inferring π from q for populations 
of organizations over time, but not q from π in single cases. 
  In consequence, the economy’s growth rate at t, ρt , only depends upon the distribution at 
t of the uses of Kt  among entrepreneurs of different q, Pt(q): 
The growth rate attains its maximum, ρ
* = π(Q), if Pt(Q) = 1 and Pt(q) = 0 for all q < Q . 
 RRR-ASSUMPTION.  Individuals of rationality qi can safely recognize all individuals 
of q < qi.  Because of their irrelevant prejudices, they underestimate the rationality of a random 
subset of individuals of q ≥ qi (possibly including  themselves, if they suffer from an inferiority 
complex), and see the highest rationality equally distributed over the complementary subset of 
these individuals.  The probability Pr(qi→q), with which an individual of rationality qi sees as 
the most rational an individual of rationality q is P(q)/[1 – F(qi – 1)] for q ≥ qi , and 0 for q < qi. 
  LEMMA 1.  If it is rational to vote for the most rational candidates, the average 
rationality of the ones voted for by individuals of rationality qi will be: 
Nearly all individuals thus vote for candidates whose q is in average higher than their own, with 
the exception of the champions, who cannot do better than vote for their peers.  And nearly all 
individuals vote in average for above-the-average candidates of q > q , with the exception of 
the least rational ones, who in average vote for average ones of q = q . 
  LEMMA 2.  If all voters cast an equal number of votes, the proportion of the votes cast 
for candidates of rationality qi, and thus the likely weight of these candidates among all the 
elected candidates, will in consequence be 
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where PV(q) is the probability function with which q is distributed over the elected candidates.  
The distribution function FV(q) and the average  V q can be calculated in the usual way.  
  RBV-PRINCIPLE.  The rationality of the elected candidates, PV(q), is superior to the 
one of the voters, P(q), as PV(1) < P(1), PV(Q) > P(Q), and  V q>   q . 
  The Comparison. – PC starts with the capital distributed to entrepreneurs of different q 
according to P(q).  The short-run growth, at t = 0, will therefore be 
At time t, the capital used by entrepreneurs of rationality q will grow (decrease) to 
The economy's capital will thus grow (decrease) to 
and its growth rate at t will therefore be 
For qS  > q , the growth rate will at first be negative, as the losses of the majority of 
entrepreneurs of q < qS  will initially exceed the gains of the minority of q > qS , but in the long 
run, for t → ∞, it will converge to the maximum, π(Q), as the capital used by all the 
entrepreneurs of q < Q will tend to become absolutely or relatively negligible.  
 Under  FC,  P(q) determines the initial allocation of capital to owners.  They make their 
initial investment choices according to Lemma 1, and thus determine the initial allocation of 
capital to entrepreneurs according to Lemma 2.  FC therefore starts with the initial capital 
distributed to entrepreneurs of different q according to PV(q), so that its initial growth rate is: 
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For owners of rationality qj , Lemma 1 implies that the initial growth rate of their portfolios is:  
  What will happen next depends on the owners’ q and moreover on their investment 
diligence.  If they lazily stick to their initial investment choices – or, in nicer words, if they 
make long-term investments – the future growth rates both of their portfolios and of the entire 
economy will be different than if they frequently reinvest.  But to follow these possibilities, the 
model needs a highly unrealistic assumption.  As noted, observing the actual performance of 
entrepreneurs helps only little in assessing their rationality, for much depends on the rationality 
with which such observing is conducted and interpreted.  This note now needs to be 
exaggerated into the assumption that such observing does not help at all. 
  But there are two reasons why this assumption, however unrealistic it might be, does not 
devalue the model’s results.  First, if such observing were taken into account, owners of higher 
q would be found to learn more from it than owners of low q, so that the comparative advantage 
of the former – which is the crucial point here – would persist.  Second, this assumption does 
not help the main result – which will be that in the long run, it is just FC that performs best – but 
on the contrary works against it: FC would be found to perform even better if the owners of 
capital were considered to learn from such observing than when they are not.
23  
  To take into account the difference between long-term (“lazy”) and short-term 
(“diligent”) investors, it suffices to consider the two extremes: all owners stick to their initial 
investment; and all owners reinvest after each period.  All the intermediate cases, in which new 
investment decisions are taken only sometimes by some owners, yield intermediate outcomes. 
  The extremely diligent, short-term investors redistribute their portfolio according to 
Lemma 1 after each period, so that the growth rate of their portfolios will be constant, equal to 
the initial one: κD(q) = κ0(q) for all q and all t.  At t, the portfolios of diligent investors of 
rationality qj  will thus grow (shrink) to  
                                                 
23  This assumption appears to be least unrealistic for risk-capital markets, where investors are choosing among 
relatively new entrepreneurs with new ideas.  But even on a standard stock-exchange, where data about the past 
performance and the current stock prices of firms abound, these data are neither sufficient nor easy to interpret 
for making good investment choices.  The above-the-average returns go, in average, to those investors who have 
the extra knack for astutely combining these data with many other observations, often including personal 
qualities of the firms’ CEOs. 
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For the extremely lazy, long-term investors, the cumulative growth of their portfolios will 
consist of the cumulative growth of the capital used by the initially chosen entrepreneurs.  At t, 
the portfolios of lazy investors of rationality qj, will thus grow (shrink) to  
  Comparing the growth rates that owners of rationality q can achieve with their capital as 
own entrepreneurs, as diligent investors, and as lazy investors, yields the following result. 
LEMMA 3:  π(q)t < κD(q)t < κL(q)t  for all q < Q and all t > 1. 
  In plain words, nearly all owners, with the exception of economic champions, can make 
their capital grow faster (decrease slower) as investors than as entrepreneurs, and more so as 
long-term investors than as short-term investors.  The reason is that little-rational owners, when 
reinvesting according to Lemma 1, transfer some of their capital, without realizing it, from the 
most rational entrepreneurs to some less rational ones.  
  The growth of the economy’s capital under FC may consequently follow many different 
trajectories, depending on what the ratio of the two types of owners happens to be.  But all these 
trajectories must be contained between two limits: the D-limit growth, in which all the owners 
of q < Q reinvest after each period; and the L-limit growth, in which all such owners leave their 
initial investment unchanged.  What helps to determine these two limits is that in this model, the 
economy’s capital is always equal both to the sum of the capital used by all entrepreneurs and 
the sum of the portfolios of all investors. 
  For the D-limit growth, the outcomes can best be deduced from the portfolios of 
investors.  As investors of abilities q are initially endowed with P(q) of capital, which they 
make grow (decrease) by κ(q) per period, the sum of all portfolios at t will be 
and the growth rate 
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  For the L-limit growth, the outcomes can best be deduced from the performance of the 
entrepreneurs with whom the owners invested once for all at t = 0 (with the exception of owners 
of q = Q, who may reinvest at will without slowing the growth).  As the owners have chosen the 
entrepreneurs according to Lemma 1, the initial capital is distributed among the entrepreneurs 
according to Lemma 2, which sets the share of entrepreneurs of competence q to PV(q).  This 
share will then grow (decrease) during each period by π(q).  The economy’s capital at t will 
grow (decrease) to: 
and its growth rate will then be: 
  For the earlier discussed reasons, DG is accorded the privilege of using the RV relation 
more times than FC, which in this model means twice: the voters elect politicians, who select 
entrepreneurs.  Lemma 2 will thus boost the rationality of government entrepreneurs above P(q) 
also twice.  First from P(q) to PV(q) for the elected politicians, and then from PV(q) to PVV(q) for 
the selected entrepreneurs.  The economy’s capital will thus start growing by 
  After that, however, not much will change.  As the voters neither gain nor lose votes 
depending on how rationally or irrationally they vote – in contrast to the owners of capital who 
do so under FC – the elected politicians and the selected entrepreneurs may change after each 
elections, but the distribution of q over both of them will not.  In consequence, the growth rate 
of the economy’s capital will remain constant: 
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(13)  0 , , DG t DG   =   ρ ρ   for all t , 
so that at t the economy’s capital will grow (decrease) to 
  The Ranking. - According to the growth rates in the short run, expressions (1), (5) and 
(12) imply that at t = 0, DG is best, FC is second, and PC is last.  If  VV q > qS >  V q , DG would 
be the only one to realize a positive growth; both FC and PC would start growing negatively 
according to a J-curve, deeper for PC than for FC.  
  According to the growth rates in the long run, the limits of expressions (4), (9), (11) 
and (13) imply that for t → ∞, those of both PC and FC converge to the maximum, π(Q), 
while DG, with its only slightly above-the-average π( VV q ), remains far behind. 
  To compare these alternatives for the total capital they will accumulate in the long run, 
it is necessary to determine the limits for t → ∞ of the ratios of their respective Kt (in absolute 
values, all Kt become infinite, including KDG,t, if  VV q>  q S).  Making these ratios from 
expressions (3), (8), (10), (14) and determining the limits discloses that FCL will grow to 
become the wealthiest, FCD and PC will share the second place, while DG will become 
infinitely poorer than any of the others.  As infinite growth is in any case impossible, the most 
important result is this relative impoverishment.  
  That FCD and PC will converge to being equally less wealthy than FCL, although 
FCD starts better (or less badly) than PC, is interesting to note.  The reason is, in essence (for 
the mathematics, see Pelikan, 1997), that the losses of PC caused by little-rational 
entrepreneurs during a relatively short initial period turn out to equal the losses of FCD 
caused by little rational, but diligent investors during a longer period.  When the entire growth 
trajectory is considered, however, FCD has the advantage that under it, the economy never 
gets as poor as, and remains for all finite t somewhat wealthier than, under PC. 
  All this fully agrees with the findings of the previous verbal analysis.  The additional 
fine point that appears to make good sense is that little-rational investors will do better both 
for themselves and for the economy if they invest long-term, rather than spend effort on 
frequent portfolio changes. 
 
IV.  Policy Implications 
 
  Because of the differences in rationality allocation between the production side and the 
final consumption side, the search for policy implications is divided into the corresponding   27
two branches.  The policy implications found will be confronted with known implications of 
incentive analysis, both to qualify them and be qualified by them.   
 
A.  The Production Side 
 
  In principle, as noted, this side can make full use of private organizations selected by, 
and remaining under lasting selective pressures of, actual and/or potential competition on both 
product and financial markets.  In consequence, as shown, their top rationality will far exceed, 
after a certain development period, the relevant rationality of government agents – be they 
elected politicians or by them directly or indirectly selected bureaucrats and experts.   These 
certainly may, and indeed must, be highly rational for other tasks – such as becoming elected, 
or making a successful career within the government bureaucracy.  But this rationality, which 
appears more closely related to speaking nicely than acting efficiently, is typically different 
from the one relevant to entrepreneurship and ownership of capital.
 24  The examples of highly 
successful top politicians with poor understanding of the production-side problems continue 
to be legion. 
   Markets are thus discovered to have more merits than usually recognized.  In addition 
to working as reasonably efficient mechanisms for allocating standard resources among given 
participants, they are moreover found to work as evolutionary devices for selecting these 
participants, and thus helping to allocate to efficient uses the non-standard resource of 
unequally bounded rationality. 
  This discovery is particularly important for financial markets, whose merits are often 
grossly underestimated.  They are found to work not only as the usually studied mechanisms 
for allocating investment, but moreover as evolutionary devices for selecting relevantly 
rational entrepreneurs and investors.  In addition, they offer the little-rational capital owner 
opportunities to have his capital fructified by entrepreneurs with higher rationality than his 
own.  Flock behavior and speculation bubbles, often seen as causes of inefficiency, prove on 
the contrary to promote it: as it is typically more rational investors who lead such flocks, and 
therefore gain more control over capital, and less rational ones who trail behind, and therefore 
lose this control, rationality allocation consequently moves towards efficiency. 
  IMPLICATION 1.  Because of the far from the best expected rationality of 
                                                 
24  Admittedly, some of these rationality differences may be due to learning environments, and not to initial 
talents.  Even the most talented person, if she enters politics, will likely learn another kind of actual rationality 
than had she entered business.  
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government agents for entrepreneurship and ownership of capital, public policies are required 
to exclude all public policies that selectively intervene in the organizing and running of the 
production-side organizations – such as national planning, selective industrial policies, and 
government ownership of enterprises, including commercial and investment banks. 
  That excluding public policies requires public policies is worth spelling out, as 
opponents of all public policies appear not always to see it.  What clarifies this apparent 
paradox is that the policies required are of the special kind that contribute to the forming and 
reforming of institutions, and may thus be termed “institutional.”
25  Although, as emphasized 
by many writers from Hayek (1967) to North (2005), far from all institutions can be formed 
and reformed by public policies, those that define the permissible scope of government 
policies definitely can.  It is the legislative branch of government that forms the institutions 
that define and limit what its executive branch is allowed and/or required to do.
26 
  In practice, of course, national planning, selective industrial policies, and government 
ownership of enterprises are now all largely discredited by their poor results, and policy 
recommendations to abandon them have become standard.  But these recommendations may 
still be challenged: they may still be accused of ideological bias and even formally refuted by 
theoretical models of optimal government behavior built on the perfect rationality assumption.  
Producing more theoretical support for them is therefore far from superfluous. 
  An important example of selective industrial policy that still attracts strong political 
support (in particular in Europe) is government investment in young industries and new 
technologies, considered to involve high risks – and more often than not also ending up with 
high losses.  What is implied here is that the height of such risks is not an objectively given 
constant, but depends on the rationality with which they are assessed: what is a high risk for 
politicians and government officials is likely to be a much lower risk for economic champions 
with own successful experience in such industries.  If such champions are in short supply, to try 
to replace them by politically selected bureaucrats – instead of inducing more of them to come 
forward and take part in relevant, politically unbiased selection – is therefore a serious policy 
error, damaging the very industries that government tries to help.
27 
                                                 
25  Institutional policies correspond to what German Ordo-liberalism terms “Ordnungspolitik,” as opposed to 
“Prozesspolitik,” and to Hayek’s (1967) “policies by general rules,” as opposed to “specific measures.”  
 
26  That government bureaucrats of the executives branch usually oppose, and often successfully hinder, 
legislation decreasing their power and privileges is a well-known problem that is not examined here.  But such 
legislation is more likely to succeed, at least in democracies, if supported by analytically solid arguments. 
 
27  Probably everyone can see the absurdity of substituting government officials for missing champions in sports, 
yet many still seem to believe that this is the right thing to do in industries.  Empirical evidence supporting this   29
  Another important example is socialism as an institutional form of production that 
excludes private ownership of capital.  After the losses of its political attraction due to the 
collapse of its Soviet and East European applications, this attraction appears again to grow, 
perhaps most in South America.  As the long-lasting theoretical controversy about its 
economic feasibility has not yet been compellingly concluded, it can also find theoretical 
support.  To be sure, both socialist planning and market socialism with labor-managed firms 
have been found, in both theory and practice, to be prohibitively inefficient.  But there is yet 
another conceivable form of socialism, for which compelling theoretical refutation is still 
missing.  This is the advanced corporate form, initially outlined by Bardham and Roemer 
(1992), which makes the most extensive use of virtually all real markets, including markets 
for financial intermediaries, and differs from financial capitalism only by keeping the ultimate 
ownership of all the production-side organizations equally distributed among all citizens, 
represented by a democratically elected government.  While standard theories allow this 
difference to be considered minor, with little impact on the economy’s performance, here it is 
found to be fatal: it would allow mediocre rationality to pervade the entire production side, and 
thus cause even such a socialist economy to become prohibitively inefficient.
28 
  IMPLICATION 2.  The additional importance of market competition for the selection of 
relevantly rational entrepreneurs and capital owners increases the importance of its 
maintenance, which increases the demands on properties of institutions.  It is even more 
important than usually considered that they facilitate the forming, development, and 
maintenance of reasonably competitive, or at least reasonably contestable, markets, where all 
actual champions are kept exposed to challenges by new entrants, and where winners are 
selected for high relevant rationality, and not low ethical standards.  These increased demands  
make it less likely that institutions with all of the needed properties could emerge 
spontaneously, which increases the demand for complementary institutional policies. 
  For example, in the long-standing controversy about antitrust and competition policies, 
                                                                                                                                                          
argument is in Dimo and Murray (2006).  While their explanations are based on analysis of incentives, analysis of 
rationality allocation provides additional backing.  How the two analyses may cooperate or qualify each other is 
discussed in Section IV.C below. 
28  The rationality argument against socialism may remind of Hayek’s (1945) knowledge argument, but is 
broader.  The latter is compelling only against informationally centralized socialist planning, for which the 
planners need to know what Hayek shows that they cannot.  But it is less compelling against informationally 
decentralized planning, and appears not to work at all against socialist ownership of firms: if so many managers 
appointed by private owners can acquire and effectively use all the knowledge needed for making even very 
large firms innovative and successful, what could hinder the managers of comparable socialist or government 
firms from also acquiring and successfully using such knowledge?  Already Schumpeter (1942/1976) answered 
“nothing,” and until now no theory appears to have compellingly proven the opposite. 
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this implication adds an argument for them.  Without underestimating the well-known 
problem of making government act in favor of the yet unknown future champions, rather than 
collude with the actual ones, even imperfect solutions of this problem are often superior, 
especially in a reasonably transparent democracy, to inaction.  Actual industrial champions, 
when free to use all of their typically extensive means to hinder new entry, may indeed 
damage the evolution of industries as much as the most inapt industrial policies.
29 
  Rationality allocation may moreover suffer because of two other types of agents: the 
incumbent managers of underperforming firms and the judges in bankruptcy procedures.  Both 
may hinder the owners from replacing the managers or selling the firms to new owners, which 
blocks the search for a more rational control of the firms’ capital.   The difference is that the 
former do so in order to defend their own positions, whereas the latter may do so because their 
rationality, given their education and selection, is not necessarily relevant to the uses of capital 
in production.  Institutions are therefore also required to protect the selection function of 
markets against both these types agents, for which some institutional policies may again be 
necessary (for instance, a reform of the bankruptcy law).
30 
  Because of the key role of financial markets in the evolution of rationality allocation, 
their institutions call for special attention.  Some of the demands on these institutions lead 
back to Implication 1: they need to exclude policies by which the evolutionary selection by 
these markets would be impaired – such as taxes on working capital and financial transactions, 
which would slow and blunt this selection in general, and selective subsidies to specific 
entrepreneurs or owners, which would distort its outcomes. 
  More demands on these institutions stem from the special nature of financial products: 
as these are mostly intangible, trading in them requires a particularly high level of trust.  This 
increases the importance of making these markets select for high relevant rationality, and not 
low ethical standards.  Although self-policing based on reputation effects is certainly necessary, 
it may not always be sufficient.  Reputation is not always easy to acquire even on developed 
markets, and is definitely unavailable on the emerging financial markets in new market 
economies.  Policies may therefore also be needed to help to form institutions by which such 
                                                 
29  Perhaps the strongest empirical evidence showing how unlimited freedom to form cartels can harm industrial 
development is possible to find in the history of German industry before the First World War, as documentented 
by Schmidt (1996).  I am grateful for this reference and its summary in English to Gerhard Wegner. 
 
30  This argument weakens the usual reason why bankruptcy laws protect incumbent managers – namely, that the 
protection motivates them to announce their economic distress in time, rather than hide it as long as possible. 
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deviant selection could be hindered, or at least rapidly disclosed and corrected.
31  The search for 
such policies involves the familiar problems of transparency, insider trading, corporate 
governance, and protection of minority owners, for which the use of legislation is often debated.  
Taking into account the selection problem strengthens the case for this use.
32 
  As all the needed institutional policies are undoubtedly difficult to conduct, Implication 
2 may appear to conflict with Implication 1, which urged government to abstain from difficult 
policies.  Why the conflict is not real is that the two difficulties are of different magnitudes.  
Implication 1 concerned difficulties which require, to be systematically overcome, the highest 
available rationality of the rare industrial champions, whom only long-lasting market 
competition may discover and select.  In contrast, the difficulties of institutional policies may be 
overcome by rationality of a less exceptional kind, that can be learned, from suitable inputs, by 
all sufficiently educated and logically thinking persons.  Although all the needed learning inputs 
are not yet available, there is no fundamental reason why, in the future, they could not.  Their 
main ingredient is knowledge of how different institutions influence the performance of 
economies, which should be possible to obtain by suitably directed theoretical research (of 
which this paper aspires to be part) and spread by literature and teaching.
33 
 
B.  The Final Consumption Side 
 
  The change of side changes policy implications in two respects.  In the markets vs. 
government controversy, they switch from strengthening the case of markets to its weakening; 
                                                 
31  What is rapid in this context can only be relative.  Thus, the roughly two years that it took the US financial 
markets to disclose the scandalous mismanagement and enormous losses of Enron must be considered very rapid 
in comparison with the more than twenty years that it has taken to disclose – and still not completely – the 
comparably scandalous  mismanagement and enormous losses of the French bank Crédit Lyonnais when it was 
entirely government-owned. 
  
 32   That neglecting such policies may cause extensive damage can be illustrated by the setback that hit in 1996 and 
1997 the until then highly successful transformation of Czech economy towards modern capitalism.  A relatively 
successful voucher privatization of most of the formerly socialist enterprises first allowed virtually all citizens to 
start trading on financial markets, either directly or through investment funds, which raised both hopes for personal 
success and enthusiasm for capitalism in general.  But the neglect of the financial market institutions (which could 
have been copied from any modern capitalist economy) allowed extensive asset-stripping by dishonest managers of 
investment funds.  This crushed much of both the hopes and the enthusiasm, and moreover caused the average level 
of honesty of the successful Czech capitalists selected by such an unruly market to be low.  Foreign investors 
started to avoid Prague and a large part of the electorate turned to capitalism-critical or even hostile political parties.  
Although since then, the institutional framework has been largely mended and many foreign investors have 
returned, the political damage and the low level of honesty are still far from repaired – as illustrated by the high 
popularity of the old communist party and the low ranking of Czech economy in the international corruption league. 
33 In slightly different terms, these conditions and the possibilities of meeting them are discussed by Vanberg and 
Buchanan (1994).   32
and instead of being value-free, they depend on the subjective preferences and values held. 
  IMPLICATION 3.  On the final consumption side, government no longer faces an elite 
of market-selected private organizations, having in average much higher relevant rationality 
than its own, but all the different final consumers, of whom many – in the above theoretical 
case, a majority – can on the contrary be expected to be less rational.  A democratically 
elected government possesses therefore the rationality potential for helping, by means of 
paternalistic policies, such little-rational consumers with certain challenging choices, and thus 
increase their well-being, or the well-being of those of their fellow citizens who feel affected 
by spillovers of their consumption, or both. 
  Perhaps the least controversial form of such paternalism is a certain minimum of 
obligatory primary education, which may be seen to deal with the human capital paradox by 
helping individuals who are so little rational that they could not rationally invest in improving 
their rationality.  More controversial examples concern health insurance and retirement plans, 
and information about the contents and health effects of food and other consumer goods, 
which government may try to supply or force the producers to supply. 
  This implication pertains to the recent Glaeser (2005) vs. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) 
controversy over the effects of bounded rationality on paternalism, where it brings support to 
the latter.  It weakens Glaeser’s anti-paternalistic argument, as this does not fully admits that 
rationality may be bounded so unequally that large groups of consumers may be much less 
rational than even the most modestly educated and imperfectly selected civil servants. 
  But this weakening is subject to qualifications.  In part, as considered below, much 
depends on the possibilities to solve the incentive problem emphasized by Glaeser.  In part, as 
noted above, much also depends on the prevailing values and preferences.  If little-rational 
consumers hurt only themselves, whether or not to help them by paternalistic policies strongly 
depends on the prevailing mixture of compassion and the values of personal integrity and 
consumer sovereignty.  If their little-rational consumption has spillover effects that also hurt 
others – and note that the very definition of such spillover effects depends on the subjective 
preferences and values of these others – the support for such policies is likely to grow, and may 
even include less libertarian forms than considered by Thaler and Sunstein. 
  IMPLICATION 4.  Because both high rationality and the information on in whom it 
might be hiding are scarce, redistribution policies, especially those diminishing poverty, may 
have more positive effects than usually argued.  In addition to their usually claimed potential of 
pleasing egalitarian values, increasing labor productivity and lowering crime level, they may 
also enlarge the segment of population able to enter the competition for high rationality, and   33
thus diminish the efficiency losses from not exploiting the existing but hidden stocks of this 
scarce resource in individuals outside this segment. 
 
C.  Taking into Account Incentives 
 
  On the production side, both incentive analysis and rationality analysis show that 
markets have important social merits: the former by pointing to their powerful profit incentives 
and the latter to their selection of agents of high relevant rationality.  Both also recognize 
advantages of private property rights which let markets allocate the proceeds.  The difference 
is that incentives depend on what this allocation is expected to be, whereas rationality 
allocation works through what this allocation has been. 
  Both analyses also show that the potential of government to help, rather than harm, the 
economy is seriously limited, one by pointing to its weak or distorted incentives (rent-seeking), 
and the other to its far from the best relevant rationality. 
  Interestingly, both these limitations of governments were already asserted by J. S. Mill 
(1861/1972): "The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of 
government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to 
speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, 
the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare 
of the community.”
34  Of these two heads, however, only the second has so far received full 
analytical support – from theories of public choice and rent-seeking, pioneered by Buchanan, 
Tollison, and Tullock (1980).  While Hayek’s (1945) knowledge argument supports the first 
head for the special case of national planning (cf. fn. 27 above), analysis of rationality 
allocation appears to be the only way to support it in full. 
 Rationality  analysis  makes  government involvement in production more difficult to 
defend than incentive analysis.  It shows that even if public choice theory were too pessimistic 
and government agents had the best intentions to promote general welfare, they would still be 
bound to cause important losses because of their far from the best relevant rationality.  It is 
moreover more diplomatic, as it accords them the benefit of the doubt that they might have the 
best intentions, and offers them the opportunity to demonstrate it by abstaining from doing 
things that they are shown unlikely to do well.  In contrast, public choice begins by assuming 
them to have bad intentions, which puts in doubt their very willingness to listen to it. 
                                                 
34 I thank for this reference to Niclas Berggren.   34
  In some cases, however, incentive analysis may soften the rationality limitation of 
government.  Examples are the markets for producer goods with extensive spillovers – such as 
basic research and infrastructure.  Such goods are known to suffer from insufficient effective 
demand, and therefore insufficient incentives for their production.  While the finding that the 
relevant rationality of government is far from the best remains valid, the lack of private 
incentives makes this finding less prohibitive: to tax-subsidize such goods with relatively low 
rationality – even if this means that much of the subsidies will be wasted on low-quality 
research and on far from the most useful infrastructure – is often a lesser evil than not subsidize 
them at all.  The losses from the government’s low relevant rationality can be minimized by 
limiting policies to subsidies and certain specifications of the demand, while keeping the supply 
reserved to competing private producers. 
  It is about financial capitalism that the two analyses agree least.  Incentive analysis 
shows that financial markets involve agency problems that make them less advantageous than 
implied by rationality analysis, whereas this analysis shows that they are less bad than implied 
by pessimistic interpretations of agency theory.  This indicates a limit to which financial 
markets can be advantageous: their agency losses must not wipe off their rationality gains. 
  There are several factors on which these losses may depend.  In addition to the culturally 
evolved and economically selected level of honesty and trust, rationality analysis concerns two.  
One consists of the institutional policies supported by Implication 2 – such as enforcing 
transparence of corporate governance and protecting minority owners.  The second is the very 
rationality of the capital owners (principals), which magnifies the importance of its efficient 
allocation.  While agency theory may provide useful hints, how well or poorly agency 
problems are solved in practice depends above all on the rationality of the principals.  
  Turning to the final consumption side, paternalism is another important topic on which 
the two analyses disagree.  In particular, incentive analysis points to the risk that the rationality 
superiority of government agents over large groups of consumers may be used for increasing 
the well-being of the former rather than the latter.  This partly restores, and in a sense may even 
amplify, Glaeser’s (2005) argument: it may be argued that the lower rationality of the latter 
makes this risk particularly high.  On the other hand, however, in a reasonably transparent 
democracy, government agents are also monitored by more rational voters, who may thus help 
to lower this risk.  Moreover, with no paternalistic policies, little-rational consumers may soften 
and distort the market selection of private producers and be even more at their mercy. 
  Combining the two analyses increases the support for redistribution policies in an 
interestingly qualified way.  Economic incentives, which redistribution is often reproached to   35
weaken, are shown to matter less than usually claimed.  As success in a competition is a well-
known human incentive by itself, the most rational individuals will often strive to show off their 
superiority to some extent independently of the size of their personal economic payoff. 
  The qualification is produced by rationality analysis itself.  Its argument that economic 
payoffs are not only incentives, but moreover means of allocating capital from less rational to 
more rational control, limits redistribution by the need to keep this allocation working.  This 
need has moreover interesting implications for the form of taxation: taxes on final consumption, 
possibly progressive, hurt it least, and thus allow the highest redistribution, while those on 
working capital, investment, and profit hurt it most. 
  Rationality analysis thus points out the often forgotten difference between redistributing 
final consumption and redistributing the control over capital in production.  While much of the 
former may be politically demanded and analytically justified, the latter always harms the 
economy.  To see it clearly, recall the old egalitarian argument by Roemer (1987) that the 
unfortunate persons who were endowed with too little talents by nature should be economically 
compensated by society.  Regardless of how much compassion for such persons one might feel, 
and for how high compensation one might consequently vote, it is clear that this compensation 
must be limited to parts of final consumption.  To let untalented persons gain control over 
capital in production would ruin the economy, leaving there little to be redistributed. 
 
V.  Concluding Comments 
 
  In economic theory, rationality analysis promises to grow into a field of its own, filling 
up some of the well-known lacunae of existing economic theories, without unreasonable 
hostility to them.  It does not entirely reject the perfect rationality assumption, only limits its 
uses to a few special cases: easy economic problems, which may be reasonably solved by 
most people; more difficult normative examples, trying to teach people to be more rational 
than they actually are; and well-developed competitive markets, whose long past evolution 
makes it plausible to assume that all the still present participants cannot be too irrational.  But 
it claims that in all the other cases, it is important to recognize that what people actually do 
may be due not only to their preferences, incentives, and information, but also to their more or 
less bounded rationality with which they know their preferences, interpret the information, 
and respond to the incentives.  As this paper has shown, these cases definitely include 
comparative analysis of the merits and demerits of alternative institutions. 
  In policy applications, rationality analysis promises to throw light on many issues, in   36
part strengthening and in part qualifying or opposing standard views.  Its use is urgently 
needed in all decisions about policies whose success may depend (and which ones do not?) on 
the rationality of government agents, or private market participants, or both.  Policy analysis 
that naively ignores rationality inequalities may also naively support policies that fail to allow 
and encourage the economically most rational individuals to come forward and create wealth, 
while allowing economically little-rational individuals to keep causing losses. 
  Interestingly, the apparent ideological conflict of its sharply “pro-market” stance on 
the production side with the more “pro-social” one on the final consumption side makes 
rationality analysis more, rather than less, practically applicable.  In today’s politics, this 
conflict appears increasingly limited to minorities of ideological purists.  Mixing the two is on 
the contrary appearing as the only feasible way to avoid both economic ruin and political 
rejection by people as they are: neither as collectivistic nor as individualistic as different pure 
ideologies might wish them to be.  Such mixing is also gaining ground in political programs 
both at the Left and at the Right – as exemplified by New Labour and Compassionate 
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